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This paper revisits the impact of OBS activities on Canadian banks risk-return 
trade-off. Recent studies (Stiroh and Rumble 2006, Calmès and Liu 2007) suggest 
that increasing OBS activities do not necessarily yield straightforward 
diversification benefits. However, adding a risk premium to earlier accounting 
returns models by resorting to an ARCH-M procedure, an updated sample reveals 
that the Canadian banks risk-return trade-off displays a structural break, around 
1997. In the second subperiod (1997-2007) of our sample, we find that the share 
of noninterest income no longer negatively impacts banks returns. Relatedly, we 
find that a risk premium emerges while, in the first period (1988-1996), the 
volatility variable is not significant in any returns equations. Our results are thus 
consistent with a maturation process story.  
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  Ce papier réexamine l’incidence des activités OBS sur l’arbitrage risque-
rendement des banques canadiennes. Des études récentes (Stiroh et Rumble 2006, 
Calmès et Liu 2007) donnent à penser que l’essor des activités OBS ne conduit 
pas nécessairement à des bénéfices de diversification accrus. Cependant, grâce à 
l’ajout d’une prime de risque aux modèles antérieurs de rendements comptables à 
l’aide d’une procédure ARCH-M, un échantillon rajeuni révèle que l’arbitrage 
risque-rendement des banques a subi un bris structurel, que l’on peut situer aux 
environs de l’année 1997. Durant la deuxième partie de notre échantillon (1997-
2007), nous constatons que la part des revenus autres que d’intérêt n’influe plus 
négativement sur les rendements bancaires. En parallèle, nous détectons 
l’émergence d’une prime de risque, alors qu’au cours de la première période 
(1988-1996), la volatilité conditionnelle n’a pas de pouvoir explicatif à l’intérieur 
des équations de rendements. Nos résultats sont donc cohérents avec un scénario 
d’apprentissage.  
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  Beginning in the 1980s in Canada, financial deepening
1 and financial 
innovations led to a more market-oriented structure with firms increasingly relying 
on financial markets to fund their investments, an evolution also observed in the 
United-States and elsewhere (Boyd and Gertler 1994, Calmès 2004, Roldos 2006). 
The evolution in the Canadian financial system gave way to a major change in 
corporate financing, characterized with a relative decreased share of banks loans 
(i.e. indirect financing) and an increased share of bonds and stocks. This financial 
transformation challenged the Canadian banking business and justified, in part, the 
successive amendments to the Canadian Bank Act. These amendments enabled 
banks to act as security dealers and offer fiduciary services and portfolio advices 
to investors
2. They also allowed banks to securitize loans, a move in line with the 
on-going financial deepening process. This kind of non traditional activities, 
previously the "chasse gardée" of the three other pillars of the Canadian financial 
system, are loosely classified as OBS (off-balance sheet) activities. At first, banks 
might have thought that these new types of activities would  have led to important 
diversification benefits, with an  improvement in their risk-return trade-off (Rose 
1989, Sauders and Walters 1994). Indeed, the decision to diversify might be 
considered endogenous (Campa and Kedia 2002, Stiroh and Rumble 2006) and the 
result of an optimization process, theoretically leading to a better risk-return trade-
off on an expanded efficient frontier.  
                                                 
1 The expression “financial deepening” refers here not only to desintermediation and increased liquidity but 
also to greater market completeness.   
2 The move towards off-balance sheet activities is partly endogenous, in the sense that it has been 
originated by banks themselves.    4
  However,  both in Canada and the United-States, researchers find quite the 
opposite: OBS activities triggered a substantial increase in the volatility of banks' 
net operating revenue growth (Acharya et al. 2002, Stiroh 2004, Stiroh 2006, 
Stiroh and Rumble 2006, Calmès and Liu 2007, Calmès and Théoret 2009). 
Furthermore, this volatility surge does not seem to be associated to greater 
absolute or risk-adjusted (accounting) measures of bank returns − i.e. the return on 
assets or the return on equity.  Actually, these measures of banks returns decreased 
with the upward trend in the share of noninterest income. Given the direct link 
between accounting measures of bank performance and the level and volatility of 
bank market returns, this situation might be perceived as problematic by banks 
stakeholders.  
In this paper, we first confirm that the surge in the OBS activities actually 
increases the banking system riskiness. To explain the paradoxical weakness of 
the diversification benefits associated to OBS activities, we provide a conjecture 
rationalizing the deterioration of the risk-return trade-off over the 1988-2007 
period (Calmès and Théoret 2009). We argue that noninterest income, being more 
related to aggregate shocks compared to interest income, increases the exposure of 
Canadian banks to market conditions, and more generally to macroeconomic 
shocks, which are not easily diversifiable and whose relative importance tends to 
grow relative to idiosyncratic shocks (Houston and Stiroh 2006). The risk-return 
worsening might also partly be explained by bank herding behaviour ─ a 
collective reaction of banks to aggregate shocks ─ which contributes to increase 
the risk exposure of the whole banking system (Baum et al. 2002, Baum et al.   5
2005, Calmès and Salazar 2006, Quagliariello 2006). This is bad news for 
financial stability but also a cause of concern for financial supervision agencies, 
and more generally for banks shareholders.  
  Second, we focus on the change in the risk-return trade-off and the integration 
of traditional lending and OBS activities. Contrary to what was observed before 
1997, we find that, over the period 1997-2007, there is no longer a negative 
correlation between banks returns and the share of noninterest income ─ the 
revenues associated to OBS activities (Pellerin 2008). Our results are consistent 
with a maturation process story. As it is usually the case, financial markets and 
institutions eventually adjust to financial innovations, even if the adjustment is 
generally slow to materialize (Caballero and Engle 2003). 
  In this respect, the main contribution of this paper is to resort to a new 
empirical framework to study the recent change in the relationship between 
various measures of banks returns and the share of noninterest income. We 
analyze the emergence of a risk premium accounting for the OBS activities 
riskiness by estimating a model of banks returns with an ARCH-M procedure 
(Engle et al. 1986), a novelty in this literature. This risk was not explicitely 
modeled in previous studies, an important omission from the standpoint of the 
asset pricing theory. Indeed, considering risk-adjusted measures only is not 
completely satisfying when returns are not first-degree homogenous in volatility. 
Instead, the volatility should appear on the RHS of the returns equations, as it is 
usually the case in asset pricing. Running this experiment unveils a maturation 
process with banks starting to price the new type of risk in 1997 when the net   6
interest and noninterest revenues correlation changed sign. DeYoung and Roland 
(2001) conjectured that the surging volatility of banks revenues should eventually 
give rise to the incorporation of risk premia in various measures of bank 
accounting returns, however, they did not test this conjecture. Our contribution 
here is precisely to fill this gap with the introduction of the returns conditional 
volatilities directly in banks returns equations. 
Our empirical study runs from the first fiscal quarter of 1988 to the fourth 
fiscal quarter of 2007. We find that the banks risk-return trade-off presents a 
structural break, which may be dated around 1997. In the second subperiod (1997-
2007) of our sample, the share of noninterest income no longer impacts negatively 
the two retained measures of banks returns, as was previously the case. Relatedly, 
we find that a risk premium emerges in the second subperiod (1997-2007) while in 
the first subperiod (1988-1996), the volatility variable is not significant in any 
returns equations. These results are consistent with a maturation process story. 
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present the stylized facts 
associated to the banking deregulation process. In section 3, we present a 
conjecture explaining the increased riskiness of the Canadian financial system. In 
section 4, we go on with the pricing of risk premia in banks returns. In this 
section, an ARCH-M estimation procedure is described and then we discuss the 
empirical results before concluding.  
 
 
   7
 
2. Banking Stylized Facts 
2.1 A Changing Financial Landscape 
  Before examining the stylized facts related to the increased riskiness in 
Canadian banking, we survey the evolution of the Canadian financial system over 
the last decades. This evolution explains in part the various amendments to the 
Canadian Bank Act which have taken place since the beginning of the 1980s. 
Insert figure 1 here 
 
  Figure 1 shows that a financial deepening process (as measured by the ratio of 
direct to indirect finance) is developing in the Canadian financial system, since 
1980.  
Insert figure 2 here 
  Consequently, and as presented in figure 2, the share of banks loans in 
Canadian corporate financing has decreased progressively since 1980. In relative 
terms, the shares of stocks and bonds have risen. The various amendments to the 
Bank Act somewhat loosen the new constraints faced by the Canadian banking 
industry. In figures 1 and 2, the dates associated to the Bank Act amendments are 
shaded. Note that the market-oriented trend tends to coincide with these dates
3. 
Incidentally, the amendments made in 1992 and 1997 are very important in the 
deregulation process, considering the changes observed thereafter. 
Insert figure 3 here 
                                                 
3 The synchronism between the Bank Act amendments and the structural breaks dates might suggest that 
financial deregulation is in part endogenous.    8
  With deregulation, banks were also allowed to securitize their loans. 
According to figure 3, the securitization process really took off in 1997
4. It 
exploded thereafter. This non traditional activity illustrates the new type of 
banking business begun after the recent changes in the Bank Act. 
As a matter of fact, the Canadian banking deregulation process and the 
concomitant changes in the financial system gave way to a number of OBS 
activities, each generating new noninterest income. Noninterest income is a 
heterogeneous aggregate that includes different components: trading income, 
gains (losses) on instruments held for other than trading purposes, fiduciary 
income, service fees, insurance and other fees and commissions. In the following 
subsections, we detail OBS banks activities relatively to their assets and document 
the resulting increased riskiness in the banking business.  
 
2.2 Valuing Banks OBS Activities 
The valuation of OBS activities presents many measurement problems 
(Calmès 2004) but we can tackle them by resorting to the method suggested by 
Boyd and Gertler (1994) who proposed to compute an asset-equivalent measure of 
OBS activities. Let rBS be the mean return on balance sheet activities, ABS be the 
value of balance sheet assets, and NBS the net revenue associated to balance sheet 
activities. We have: 
BS BS BS N A r =  
                                                 
4 The timing of securitization in Canada is partly related to the innovations made by the Canadian Mortgage 
and Housing Corporation (CMHC). The securitization process in Canada began in 1987 with the launching 
of the NHA MBS (National Housing Act – Mortgage-backed securities) by the CMHC. Securitization is 
much more developed in the United-States than in Canada, especially because of the earlier presence there 
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  The balance sheet assets are thus the capitalization, at the rBS rate, of the net 





A =  
where  AOBS is the asset-equivalent of OBS activities, NOBS is the net revenue 
associated to OBS activities and rOBS is the mean return on OBS activities. 
Assume that 
OBS BS r r =  
that is the capitalization rate of balance sheet assets is the same as the one of OBS 













A = =  
where NOR stands for net operating revenue. We measure respectively the ratio 
(NOBS / NOR) by the share of noninterest income and the ratio (NBS / NOR) by the 
share of net interest income in net operating revenue. We thus arrive at the 
following measure of OBS activities, for the eight Canadian most important 








where snonin represents the share of noninterest income,  and sni the share of net 
interest income. According to the asset equivalent computation, the assets related 
to Canadian banks OBS activities are equal to 2790 billion $, an amount 122%   10
larger than the level of balance sheet assets. By comparison, they only represented 
39% of balance sheet assets in 1988. Hence, we can state that similarly to the 
American banks, Canadian banks activities are increasingly dominated by OBS 
activities.  
Insert figure 4 here 
  Figure 4 shows the resulting growing importance of the share of noninterest 
income in Canadian banks' net operating revenue. Its upward trend began in 1992 
and lasted until the bursting of the market bubble at the opening of the second 
millennium. By 2000, noninterest income accounted for 57% of net operating 
revenue, up from only 25% in 1988. This ratio seems to have stabilized thereafter, 
our first evidence of a maturation process story. It recovered somewhat after the 
high tech bubble burst, culminating at 60% in the first quarter of 2006 before 
decreasing again with the recent credit crisis. Note also that the fluctuations of the 
share of noninterest income are much larger after 1997 than before. Indeed, this 
share became increasingly sensitive to the fluctuations of financial markets 
(Calmès 2004, Calmès and Liu 2007).  
Insert figure 5 about here 
  As suggested by figure 5, the growing share of noninterest income in banks' 
net operating revenue has boosted the bank ratio of noninterest income (per 100$ 
of balance sheet assets). Excluding the drop of this ratio during the 1998 financial 
crisis (the Russian debt episode), this ratio doubled between 1988 and 2001. It 
decreased steeply during the financial markets collapse of the beginning of the 
second millennium and did not really recover thereafter. There is thus also   11
evidence of a maturation process here. Again, and similarly to the share of 
noninterest income, this ratio is increasingly dependent on financial markets 
fluctuations.  
Insert figure 6 here 
The post 1997 increased volatility of the noninterest income share is much 
more striking if we consider individual banks instead of the pool of the eight 
Canadian domestic banks. Figure 6 provides a comparison of the noninterest 
shares for three Canadian banks differing by size: a relatively small-sized bank, 
the National Bank of Canada (NBC); a medium-sized bank, the Toronto-
Dominion Bank (TD), and a large-sized bank, the Royal Bank of Canada (RBC). 
Contrary to the RBC share, which is much more representative of the pool, the 
NBC and especially the TD share have become very volatile since the financial 
crisis of 1997. While the NBC share has remained on a volatile upward trend 
before collapsing on the fourth quarter of 2007, the TD share has decreased 
substantially since 2000. The dispersion between banks shares has also greatly 
increased since 1997, perhaps an additional indication of improved diversification 
in the Canadian banking industry since that year.  
Insert figure 7 here 
2.3 The Increase in Operating Revenue Growth Volatility 
  The noninterest income share of banks operating revenue is thus increasing. 
And as shown at figure 7, the noninterest income component of banks net 
operating revenue is more volatile than the net interest income one. The volatility 
of the noninterest income growth was exacerbated by the market turmoil which   12
took place around the turn of the second millennium, which suggests that 
noninterest income is becoming very sensitive to stock markets. 
Hence, the direct impact of the growing share of noninterest income is the 
increase in the volatility of banks' net operating revenue growth. Indeed, activities 
related to noninterest income are much more volatile than those associated 
associated to net interest income (Stiroh 2004, Calmès and Liu 2007). There is 
actually a diversification effect due to the fact that the correlation between interest 
and noninterest income is less than one, but this indirect effect is quite low in 
comparison to the direct one (Calmès and Liu 2007).  Moreover, the correlation 
between these two forms of income is quite unstable. Hence, the direct 
contribution of noninterest income to the volatility of net operating revenue 
growth largely dominates. By increasing the operating leverage, this effect 
magnifies the volatility of profits growth (De Young and Roland 2001).  
A decomposition of the variance of  Canadian banks net operating revenue 
growth will shed more light on the relative contribution of noninterest income to 
the increased volatility of total income growth.  
Following Stiroh (2006) and Calmès and Liu (2007), we decompose the net 
operating revenue growth with a portfolio approach in order to analyze its 
volatility with two components: volatility of net interest income growth and 
volatility of noninterest income growth. The growth of net operating revenue 
(NOR) is computed as: 
() ( ) 1
1
ln ln ln ) ln( −
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Its variance may thus be decomposed as follows:    13
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revenue. The direct contribution of noninterest income to 
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2 1 NI d w σ − . Since noninterest income is usually more volatile than net 
interest income, the growing importance of noninterest income in bank net 
operating revenue directly increases 
2
) ln(NOR d σ . But as long as the correlation 
between the growth rates of noninterest income and net interest income is not 
equal to 1, the trade-off between net operating revenue growth and volatility can 
improve. 
Insert table 1 here 
Table 1 reports the variance decomposition of net operating revenue growth 
over sub-periods ranging from 1988 to 2007. Time intervals correspond to 
different legislative periods. In the sub-periods 1988-1992 and 1993-1997, 
noninterest income seems to help reduce net operating revenue variance below 
what it would have been if banks relied solely on interest income. For example, in 
the 1988-1992 episode, net operating revenue variance was 14.2, lower than the 
16.9 variance of net interest income. It can even be argued that from 1993 to 1997, 
there were clearly diversification benefits, net interest income volatility being   14
higher than that of net operating revenue, and the correlation between the two 
components of net operating revenue being slightly negative.  
  However, the two following sub-periods are quite different. During both sub-
periods, the variance of net operating revenue growth is much higher than the 
variance of net interest income growth, which means that noninterest income 
growth increased substantially the volatility of net operating revenue growth. The 
variance of net operating revenue growth also jumped compared to the previous 
subperiods. The subperiod 1998-2002, which was plagued by excessive financial 
market fluctuations, is particularly symptomatic.  The variance of noninterest 
income growth jumped to 212.3, while it was not higher than 40 before. During 
this subperiod, income from trading and investment activities was one of the 
major contributors to noninterest income volatility both in Canada (Calmès and 
Liu 2007) and in the United- States (Stiroh 2006). This subperiod, associated to a 
financial turmoil, seems to have helped consolidate traditional lending activities 
and OBS ones.  
  Indeed, during the sub-period 2003-2007, the volatility of net operating 
revenue growth receded, but it remained much higher than before the 1998-2002 
financial crisis. In fact, the volatility of noninterest income growth has 
approximately doubled with respect to its level before the 1998-2002 subperiod. 
However, note that during this subperiod, the correlation between net interest and 
noninterest income growth became clearly negative, a rather new trend which 
contributes to dampen the direct pervasive impact of noninterest income on the 
volatility of net operating revenue growth. We might consider these recent   15
developments as the concretization of a maturation process. In other words, this 
observation is consistent with the idea that non traditional activities are now better 
understood and managed − a standard “learning by doing” took place. Note 
however that the volatility of noninterest income growth is increasingly related to 
the one of income from trading and investment activities, the highest among the 
components of noninterest income, a delicate situation from the standpoint of the 
risk-return trade-off.  
  To conclude, the Canadian banking system definitively became riskier 
following the successive deregulation waves, and this might be bad news from the 
standpoint of financial stability. But thanks to the financial market turmoil we 
recently went through, adjustments to deregulation are now on the way. We test 
these hypotheses in the next sections. 
 
3. A Conjecture about the Deteriorating Risk-Return Trade-Off 
 
  OBS activities generate a specific systemic risk, which, by nature, is non-
diversifiable. Consequently, Canadian banks have become more sensitive to 
aggregate shocks (both macroeconomic and financial). Our preliminary 
experiments results tend to suggest that financial aggregate shocks have gained 
momentum relative to indiosyncratic ones. Houston and Stiroh (2006) document 
the same phenomenon in the United-States. And data suggest that this situation is 
even more pronounced if we shift the analyis from individual banks to the whole 
set of Canadian banks. There also seems to be some evidence of a herding 
behaviour whereby banks tend to behave alike when faced by aggregate shocks,   16
which both add to and compound the existing systemic risk (Calmès and Salazar 
2006).  
  In this context,  net interest income, being related to physical stocks, (e.g. 
loans and other assets), tends to respond to idiosyncratic shocks, like borrower 
default, whereas noninterest income, being related to flows, (e.g. service fees and 
trading revenues) would react more to aggregate shocks, like unexpected changes 
in stock market indices and macroeconomic aggregates (Calmès 2003). Since the 
former shocks are diversifiable while the latter are not, this observation 
complements the idea that the changing structure of bank revenues is associated 
with increasingly volatile banks' net operating revenues growth, as already 
suggested in Calmès (2004) and Stiroh (2004). With a greater involvement in OBS 
activities, Canadian banks are more sensitive to financial aggregate shocks.  
  In this spirit, Houston and Stiroh (2006) find that financial aggregate risk has 
increased in the United-States since 1990 (relative to idiosyncratic risk). We still 
have to confirm this more formally, but if this is also the case for Canada, there 
would be an additional force driving banking risk and compounding the effect of 
higher banks sensitivity to risk
5. We can represent the banks exposure to aggregate 
shocks by the simple following product: 
Exposure to aggregate risk = sensitivity to aggregate shocks x level of aggregate risk 
where the level of aggregate risk is itself the product of aggregate risk frequency 
and intensity. While the two factors on the RHS of this equation rise as it has been 
the case in recent episodes, it constitutes a situation unfavourable to financial 
stability.  
                                                 
5 We are currently conducting research on that topic.   17
  This picture gets even clearer when shifting the focus from individual banks to 
the whole Canadian banking network. Being more exposed to aggregate shocks, 
banks are also likely to have more often similar reactions to economic events, a 
trend which could obviously increase banking riskiness further. Indeed this bank 
herding behaviour, i.e. the tendency for banks to move together in periods of 
economic uncertainty, documented both in the United-States (Baum et al. 2002) 
and in Canada (Calmès and Salazar 2006), should contribute to the greater 
exposure of banks to aggregate shocks. About the studies investigating the issue of 
the link between macroeconomic uncertainty and bank herding, Quagliariello 
(2006) notes that Canadian intermediaries display this behaviour  when facing 
more pronounced aggregate uncertainty. Quagliariello (2006) observes a similar 
herding behaviour for the Italian banks. His contribution is to distinguish 
aggregate uncertainty from the idiosyncratic one. In the case of Italian banks, he 
reports that the herding behaviour is at play when macroeconomic or aggregate 
uncertainty increases. Consistent with Baum et al.  (2002) and Calmès and Salazar 
(2006), he confirms that when idiosyncratic risk rises, banks behave 
heterogeneously. According to the author, this observation is related to the 
competitive advantage of better informed banks behaving in a different way, 
compared to poorly informed intermediaries.   
If aggregate shocks are increasingly important in Canadian banking, bank 
herding could become a structural and not just a cyclical phenomenon, as 
previously thought, and this would then translate into an increased correlation 
between banks accounting and equity returns. This is also bad news for the   18
investors in search of portfolio diversification, since herding is at the antipodes of 
diversification and it weakens banking stability.  
 
4. Methodology and Empirical Results 
4.1 Two Hypotheses about the Maturation Process 
  It is well-known that markets usually undertake the necessary adjustments 
when confronted with increased risk. According to the stylized facts we document, 
a structural break has taken place around 1997. In this respect, the hypotheses 
studied in this paper are the following. 
  We want first to examine whether there is a maturation process taking place in 
the Canadian banking sector, as expected by Calmès (2003). According to this 
hypothesis, in the long run, the share of noninterest income in banks' net operating 
revenue would no longer impact negatively on banks accounting performance 
measures. We confirm this idea and date the break-even point around 1997. A 
Chow test is run to check for this structural break.  
  Second, we want to confirm that, in light of the increased riskiness of their 
operations, Canadian banks have adjusted to this situation by incorporating a risk 
premium in the return of their OBS activities. This premium, pricing the risk 
associated to OBS activities, came with some delay, and emerged around the year 
1997.  
  Note that De Young and Roland (2001) conjecture that the surging volatility 
of banks revenues should give rise to the incorporation of risk premia in various 
measures of bank accounting returns. However, they did not test this conjecture.   19
One of our main research contributions here is precisely to introduce a risk 
measure in the returns equations to test this hypothesis. 
4.2 The Model 
  We test the impact of the growing share of noninterest income on bank 
performance by resorting to an empirical model used by Stiroh (2004) for the 
United-States and by Calmès and Liu (2007) and Calmès and Théoret (2009) for 
Canada. The general form of this model is
6 
t t t t t X snonin y y ε β β β β + + + + = − 3 2 1 1 0         (1) 
where yt is an accounting measure of bank performance – i.e ROE and ROA –, 
snonint is the share of noninterest income in net operating revenue, Xt is a vector 
of control variables, and εt is the innovation or error term.  Xt  control for factors 
that impact banks performance (e.g. bank size, riskiness of loans or asset growth).  
  Following Stiroh (2004) and Calmès and Liu (2007), equation (1) is also 
estimated on a risk-adjusted basis. In this equation, yt is divided by a fourth-
quarter moving average of its standard deviation. To scale down yt, we also resort 
to a measure of risk used in Calmès and Théoret (2009), deflating yt by its 
conditional volatility as measured by a GARCH(1,1) model, which constitutes, to 
our knowledge, a novelty in this literature. We also test for other well-known 
econometric specifications of conditional volatility, like GARCH(p,q), TARCH, 
EGARCH and PARCH, using also different distributions for the error term 
(normal, Student and generalized error (GED)), but find that the standard 
                                                 
6 For an alternative model concerning bank performance see Théoret (1991).    20
GARCH(1,1) specification is the best measure of conditional volatility according 
to traditional measures of econometric fit (e.g. the Akaike and Schwarz criteria).   
It is possible that the increasing volatility of banks operating revenues might 
have given rise to the introduction of a risk premium in equation (1). Actually, 
traditional finance establishes a risk-return trade-off such that 
t t t risk r μ θ θ + + = 2 1  
where rt stands for return, riskt is a risk measure, and μt the innovation. This is the 
reason why, following Calmès and Théoret (2009), risk is explicitly introduced in 
equation (1) by resorting to an ARCH-M model
7, such that: 
t t c t t t t X snonin y y ε σ β β β β β + + + + + = − , 4 3 2 1 1 0       (2) 




1 , 1 0
2
, − − + + = t t c t c ε θ σ θ θ σ  
The ARCH-M procedure is very appealing to estimate the risk premium in this 
context because it directly incorporates the conditional volatility, our measure of 
risk, in the return equation instead of running a regression on returns defined on a 
risk-adjusted basis, i.e. a measure of return scaled down by an "ad hoc" measure of 
its volatility.  
 
5. Empirical Results 
5.1 The Data 
  Our sample is composed of the eight major Canadian domestic banks runs 
from the first fiscal quarter of 1988 to the fourth fiscal quarter of 2007. Data come 
                                                 
7 The ARCH-M model is due to Engle et al. (1987).    21
from the Canadian Bankers Association and the Office of the Superintendent of 
Financial Institutions (Canada). Unit root tests suggest that all statistical series are 
stationary, so they are modelled in levels. Following Calmès and Liu (2007), we 
keep the ratio of loan loss provisions to total assets as the only control variable 
because the other ones are found not significant. 
5.2 The Results over the Whole Sample 
Table 2 reports the estimation of equations (1) and (2) for the whole sample 
period running from 1988 to 2007. Estimating equation (1) − which excludes a 
risk premium − for the ratios ROE and ROA gives good results with an adjusted R
2 
equal to 0.72 for both ratios. Before adjusting for risk, estimation of equation (1) 
reveals that the coefficient of the share of noninterest income is significantly 
negative for the two performance ratios. This sign confirms that increased OBS 
activities tended to reduce Canadian banks mean returns over the whole period of 
analysis. It is equal to -0.11 in the ROE equation, and a much higher figure obtains 
for ROA one, -0.39, an expected result since the ratio of ROA to ROE is mean-
reverting to a level of 4 over the period of analysis (this ratio is not very volatile 
except during extreme events
8). These results suggest that OBS activities reduce 
the performance of Canadian banks in terms of mean returns over the whole 
sample period, while they also increase the volatility of bank net operating 
revenue growth. 
Insert table 2 here 
                                                 
8 For instance, for the fourth fiscal  quarter of 2007, the eight major Canadian banks had a ROE of 0.18 and 
a ROA of 0.79.    22
  These findings might cast doubt on the belief that noninterest income activities 
can lead to better bank performance through  activities diversification (reduction 
in risk and/or higher returns). Consistent with the expectation that loan loss 
provisions lower profits, the coefficient of the ratio of loan loss provisions to total 
assets is significantly negative in all equations, being equal to -0.14 in the ROE 
equation and to -0.55 in the ROA one, this last coefficient being about four times 
higher than the former, as expected. Since the ratio of loan losses provisions 
jumps during recessions, it accentuates the procyclicality of ROE and ROA, − 
which, in other respects, became more procyclical following the banks increasing 
involvement in OBS activities.  
  According to table (1),  regressing equation (1) using risk-adjusted 
performance ratios leads to a decrease of adjusted R
2, due to the fact that the 
scaling factor fluctuates greatly from one period to another. Results tend to 
improve when using conditional volatility (instead of the historical one) to scale 
the performance ratios, especially for ROA for which the adjusted R
2 increases 
from 0.15 to 0.70. In other respects, the results are similar to those obtained for the 
regressions without risk adjustment.  
  Running regressions with the returns variables scaled by volatilities, as done in 
previous studies (e.g. Stiroh 2006), helps account for the risk associated to OBS 
activities. However, the direct introduction of a risk measure in the returns 
equations, a standard procedure in asset pricing theory, tends to produce more 
accurate results. This is the reason why we propose the use of an ARCH-M 
procedure to explicitly account for the risk premium. Indeed, over the whole   23
sample period, this approach improves the adjusted R
2 for both equations of ROE 
and ROA. The sensitivity of ROE to the conditional volatility of the innovation is 
1.85. At 9.78, it appears much higher for ROA, a normal situation, as explained 
earlier. More importantly, the rigorous incorporation of a risk premium in the 
returns equation leads to some significant changes in the sensitivities of ROE and 
ROA to the yt-1 and snonin variables. In both equations, following the addition of a 
risk premium, the coefficient of snonin almost double in absolute value, shifting 
from -0.11 to -0.20 in the ROE equation and from -0.39 to -0.72 in the ROA one. 
This shift is achieved at the expense of the autoregression coefficient. Before 
adding the risk premium, the coefficient of yt-1 is equal to 0.15 for ROE and 0.11 
for ROA, and is significant for both returns measures. But when accounting for the 
risk premium, the coefficient of yt-1 is near 0 in both equations, and no longer 
significant. In summary, introducing the risk premium in the returns equation 
neutralizes the autoregressivity of the returns variables, transfering this impact to 
the  snonin variable, which becomes even more potent. Hence, the standard 
specification of returns overstates the role of yt-1 relative to snonin. Using our 
approach instead, snonin  appears to be the main factor for explaining banks 
returns over the whole sample.  
5.3 The Maturation Process Story 
  As documented previously, a structural break took place around 1997 (Pellerin 
2008). This break corresponds to the increase in the volatility of  the net operating 
revenues growth and of the ratio of noninterest income (per 100$ of assets). We 
thus reestimate equation (2) over the two following subperiods: 1988-1996 and   24
1997-2007. The results are reported in table 3. A Chow test confirms that a 
structural break occurred around 1997. According to table 3, hypothesis 1 tends to 
be supported by the data. The strong negative effect of snonin on either ROE or 
ROA  seems to have been only significant over the first subperiod, running from 
1988 to 1996. Indeed, the estimated coefficients of the snonin variable are much 
higher over the first subperiod (1988-1996) than over the whole sample (1988-
2007), being respectively -0.66 and -2.61 for ROE and ROA over the former 
period and -0.20 an -0.72 over the latter period. In the second subperiod (1997-
2007), the coefficient of snonin is actually positive but not significant in both 
returns equations (i.e. for ROE and ROA). This evidence supports the hypothesis 
that a maturation process took place, which led to a better integration of the 
traditional bank lending activities with OBS ones. In other words, adjustment to 
the worsening risk-return trade-off was slow to materialize (Calmès 2003), but 
finally emerged in the second part of the sample. 
  The second hypothesis seems also supported by the empirical evidence. The 
ARCH-M procedure used in this paper proves very useful for capturing the 
nonlinearity created by the change in volatility of revenues. As table 3 shows, a 
significant risk premium, required to price the increasing risk related to the 
surging OBS activities, emerges in the second subperiod, the coefficients 
associated to the conditional volatility being respectively 1.04 and 5.49 for ROE 
and ROA, both significant at the 5% level. In contrast, over the first subperiod, this 
risk premium is not significant. The sign of the coefficients of the conditional 
volatility is even negative in both equations, suggesting that over this subperiod,   25
volatility was actually detrimental to returns. As noted previously, beginning 
around 1997, the volatility of the operating revenues growth and of the share of 
noninterest income have increased greatly. Finally note that, for both returns, the 
adjusted R
2 is much lower in the second subperiod because the idiosyncratic risk 
increased substantially during this second subperiod (1997-2007). 
  To conclude on these experiments, this evidence supports the idea that a 
maturation process took place, and that Canadian banks have adapted to the 
increased volatility of their operations.  
 
6. Conclusion 
  Following deregulation, risk definitively increased in the Canadian banking 
system because the volatility of noninterest income growth is much higher than 
the one of net interest income growth. Even if the adequate pricing for this 
increased risk was slow to materialize, it finally emerged in 1997, and financial 
institutions adapted to the new situation. Previous studies on the subject (e.g. 
Stiroh 2006, Calmès and Liu 2007) were somewhat dubious about the 
diversification benefits associated to the rising share of OBS activities, and about 
their relative profitability. The new evidence we provide suggests that a 
maturation process is actually at play, leading to a better pricing of  banks 
activities and a better integration of these activities with traditional lending in the 
more recent periods (after 1997). Actually, over the last period running from 2003 
to 2007, a significant negative correlation appeared between interest and   26
noninterest income, which has been rarely the case before. This suggests that the 
OBS diversifications benefits finally unravels.   
  Concerning the need to re-regulate in order to control the increased risk in the 
Canadian banking system, we must realize that the move toward OBS activities 
might be endogenous to the banking industry, in the sense that it was originated by 
banks themselves. Under that scenario, banks initiated and even fostered the 
financial deregulation process, by shifting their activities toward, a priori, more 
profitable ones, like underwriting and securitization. Indeed, the branches network 
of Canadian banks was becoming less profitable. During the transition, banks have 
encouraged their customers to be more market-oriented, substituting securities 
issues for loans. Based on this plausible scenario and on the endogeneity of the 
deregulation process, re-regulation would not be a good idea. There is also 
evidence that banks engaged in new activities before having received the 
authorization to do so
9. The legislators only sanctioned such moves, an example of 
banks and government intermingling interests.  
  Our results open the doors to very promising research avenues. First, the 
decision by a bank to diversify its activities has to be endogenized, as suggested 
by Campa and Kedia (2002), a research avenue previously mentioned by Stiroh 
(2006)
10.  
  Second, the pricing of OBS activities is still in its infancy in the setting of the 
literature related to our study. Our paper makes a first contribution in that 
                                                 
9 This was the case for two Canadian banks engaged in brokerage activities before the 1987 Bank Act 
amendment. Banks capitalized on Bank Act loopholes at the time.  
10 We are presently conducting research on the subject.    27
direction. However, equations of banks returns must be improved further to shed 
more light on the banks risk-return trade-off.  
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Figures 
 
Figure 1 Direct to Indirect Finance, Canada, 1968-2002 
 
 
Source: Calmès (2004); Calmès and Salazar (2006) 
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Source: Calmès (2004)   31
Figure 3 Canadian banks securitization, 1989-2002 
 
Source: Calmès (2004) 
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     Figure 6 Share of noninterest income in net operating revenue, three Canadian 















Note: RBC: Royal Bank of Canada; TD: Toronto Dominion Bank; 
NBC: National Bank of Canada; TOT: eight Canadian domestic 
banks.     35
Figure 7 Volatility of banks net operating revenue growth, 1984-2002 
 
Source : Calmès (2004)  36
Tables 
 
Table 1 Decomposition of the variance of net operating revenue growth, before 
provisions, Canadian banks, 1988-2007 
 
   1988-1992     1993-1997 
  Average share  Variance  Contribution to    Average share  Variance  Contribution to 
         variance           variance 
Net operating revenue    14.2        9.4   
Net interest income  0.70  16.9  8.4    0.64  9.8  4.0 
Noninterest income  0.30  30.2  2.6    0.36  40.4  5.3 
Covariance   7.5  3.1      -0.9  -0.4 
Correlation     0.33        -0.04   
              
              
  1998-2002    2003-2007 
  Average share  Variance  Contribution to    Average share  Variance  Contribution to 
         variance           variance 
Net operating revenue    57.4        22.3   
Net interest income  0.49  9.7  2.3    0.45  13.6  2.8 
Noninterest income  0.51  212.3  55.9    0.55  75.7  22.6 
Covariance   6.1  3.0      -4.2  -2.1 
Correlation      0.14           -0.13    
   37
 
Table 2 Profitability of the eight Canadian domestic banks vs noninterest income share, 
1988Q1 – 2007Q4 
 
Note: Explanatory variables: yt-1, lagged dependent variable; snonin, share of noninterest income in net operating revenue; 
LLP, ratio of loan loss provisions over total assets; DUMiQ, dummy variable taking the value of 1 for the i
th quarter and 0 
otherwise; σuc,t, unconditional volatility of the dependent variable computed using a rolling window of four quarters; σc,t, 
conditional volatility of the dependent variable using a GARCH(1,1) model. ROE(1) and ROA(1) are models without 
conditional volatility. ROE(2) and ROA(2) are ARCH-M models incorporating the conditional volatility of the dependent 
variable. Asterisks indicate the significance levels: * stands for 10%, ** stands for 5% and *** stands for 1%. 
   ROE(1)  ROE(2)  ROE/σuc,t  ROE/σc,t  ROA(1)  ROA(2)  ROA/σuc,t  ROA/σc,t 
c  0.24*** 0.25*** 12.58** 2.94*** 1.02*** 0.21***  23.71***  5.16*** 
yt-1  0.15** -0.01  0.75***  0.60***  0.11*  0.01 -4.72** 0.11 
snonin  -0.11** -0.20***  -16.43**  -1.72  -0.39** -0.72*** -22.32*  -2.20** 
LLP  -0.14*** -0.15*** -7.97*** -1.99*** 0.55*** -0.59***  -9.31**  -2.49*** 
DUM2Q  -0.02 -0.01 1.24 -0.60*  -0.06 -0.03 2.37 -0.37 
DUM3Q  -0.02 -0.01 -0.51 -0.20 -0.05 -0.05 3.32 -0.28 
DUM4Q  -0.03** -0.02*  0.32  -0.65**  -0.11**  -0.09**  2.57  -0.55 
σc,t  -  1.85**  - - -  9.78***  - - 
Adjusted R
2  0.72 0.80 0.67 0.68 0.72 0.83 0.15 0.70   38
 
 
Table 3 Profitability of three Canadian banks vs noninterest income share over 
subperiods 1988-1996 and 1997-2007 
 
   ROE1988-1996  ROE1997-2007  ROA1988-1996  ROA1997-2007 
c  0.48***  0.44*** 2.02*** 0.39*** 
y(t-1)  0.07  -0.25 0.07** -0.02 
snonin  -0.66***  0.10 -2.61*** 0.12 
LLP  -0.16*** -0.07  -0.62***  -0.54* 
DUM2Q  -0.01 0.01  -0.03  -0.03 
DUM3Q  -0.01  -0.01 -0.01 -0.05 
DUM4Q  -0.01 -0.01  -0.03  -0.11* 
σt,c  -3.45 1.04***  -4.15  5.49** 
Adjusted R
2  0.96  0.29 0.97 0.43 
 
Note: Explanatory variables: yt-1, lagged dependent variable; snonin, share of noninterest income in net operating revenue; 
LLP, ratio of loan loss provisions over total assets; DUMiQ, dummy variable taking the value of 1 for the i
th quarter and 0 
otherwise; σc,t, conditional volatility of the dependent variable computed using an ARCH-M procedure (equation 2). 
Asterisks indicate the significance levels: * stands for 10%, ** stands for 5% and *** stands for 1%. 